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Abstract 
Juries rarely receive attention in public administration despite the explicitly 
“public” nature of their function and the determinative nature of their 
decision-making. Applying the theoretical construct of public participation 
to jury decision making, we find that Black defendants are less likely to be 
convicted by juries composed of a higher percentage of Black jurors and 
are more likely to be convicted by juries composed of a higher 
percentage of White and Hispanic jurors. Thus, analysis of public 
participation must account for the relative inclusivity and diversity of 
participants as this will likely affect the output of the process. In short, 
diversity matters in public participation. 
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The one place where a man ought to get a square deal is in a court- 
room, be he any color of the rainbow, but people have a way of carry- 
ing their resentments right into a jury box. 
Harper Lee, 1960, p. 233 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Juries rarely receive attention in public administration despite the explicitly 
“public” nature of their function and the determinative nature of their deci- 
sion making. Indeed, juries could be considered a fully realized manifesta- 
tion of public participation, and thereby an entirely appropriate candidate for 
study from a public administration perspective. As such, this research makes 
the conceptual argument that juries ought to be included in the prevailing 
public participation paradigm. Furthermore, this study provides an empirical 
examination of actual juries to assess whether juror diversity has an effect on 
votes to convict. We find that Black defendants are less likely to be convicted 
by juries composed of a higher percentage of Black jurors and are more 
likely to be convicted by juries composed of a higher percentage of White 
and/or Hispanic jurors. Thus, discussions of public participation ought to 
move away from a generic discussion of “the public” and make careful con- 
sideration of which members of the public are, and are not, participating as 
this may affect the output of the deliberation. 
 
Public Participation 
Calls for increased citizen involvement in governmental decision-making 
and policy implementation processes permeate the public administration lit- 
erature (Creighton, 2005; Holmes, 2010; Innes & Booher, 2004; Kathlene & 
Martin, 1991; King, Feltey, & Susel, 1998; Roberts, 2008; Stewart, 2007). 
As demonstrated by a recent symposium,
1 
however, there is considerable 
range and variation in what is meant by “public participation” in terms of 
intent, process, participants, and results (Stout, 2010). Although hardly 
definitive, the definition of citizen participation offered by Roberts (2008) 
suffices: “the process by which members of a society (those not holding 
office or administrative positions in government) share power with public 
officials in making substantive decisions and in taking actions related to the 
community” (p. 7). The key is that citizens are “personally involved and 
actively engaged” as opposed to having elected surrogates represent citizens’ 
interests in decision making (p. 7). 
The dominant theme in the extant literature is that more public participation 
in public administration is better (Stewart, 2007). This normative sentiment is 
typified by Thomas (1995): “More often than seeing problems from too much 
public involvement, I have seen how the wrong public decisions were made or 
how the right public decisions failed as a consequence of too little public 
involvement” (p. xiii). Conversely, Walters, Aydelotte, and Miller (2000) con- 
tend that “people who serve full time in government positions, whether elected 
or appointed” are best positioned to make the kinds of policy decisions that are 
 
  
 
 
 
increasingly “complex and highly technical” in nature (p. 357). Finally, a small, 
but robust, body of research avoids the normative discussion altogether by 
accepting that citizen participation mechanisms exist and focuses on making 
them “better explained and understood” (Stewart, 2007, p. 1069). 
A critical caveat is in order, even for the most ardent advocates of enhanced 
opportunities for deliberative democracy. Arguments for the involvement of 
the public in governmental and bureaucratic processes typically envision it as 
a compliment to political representation and administrative expertise, not as 
a replacement or alternative (Fung, 2006). This notion is well articulated by 
Brainard and McNutt (2010): 
 
Public administrators create opportunities to engage with citizens and 
use those opportunities to educate, organize, and activate citizens to 
advocate and participate in the larger public sphere on their own 
behalf. It also means that public administrators would engage with 
citizens to collaboratively identify and define problems and create and 
implement solutions to those problems. A part of this, government- 
citizen relations would become more deliberative and dialogic rather 
than regulative and based on authority. (p. 841-842) 
 
For this model of administrator–citizen “coproduction” (Bovaird, 2007) to 
manifest successfully, Yang (2006) argued that administrators must have the 
requisite degree of trust in the participating citizens, the implicated institu- 
tions, and a latent propensity to trust others. 
Another essential consideration is the type of participative mechanism. In 
her foundational analysis, Arnstein (1969) identified the following eight con- 
ceptions of citizen participation: manipulation, therapy, informing, consulta- 
tion, placation, partnership, delegated power, and citizen control. Most of 
these mechanisms for participation are described as being a “substitute for 
genuine participation” or constituting an attitude of “tokenism” that perpetu- 
ates the power position of governmental actors at the expense of citizens 
(Arnstein, 1969, p. 217). Only at the extreme does authentic delegation of 
authority occur, with the rarest of circumstances resulting in the ceding of 
control over participation, management, and negotiation to citizens. On 
reviewing 26 distinct mechanisms for citizen participation, Stewart (2007) 
compressed Arnstein’s model into three general categories. Informative exer- 
cises position citizens at the receiving end of policy decisions made by state 
officials. Citizens provide input during “consultative” opportunities, but the 
final decision is made by state officials. Only in delegative mechanisms are 
citizens authorized to make complete, but not final, decisions, as government 
 
 
officials also participate. Although Stewart does not make such an assertion, 
it is clear from the prevailing literature that informative exercises are norma- 
tively insufficient, that consultative opportunities are perhaps the most famil- 
iar type of citizen participation in both practice and academic discussion, and 
that delegative mechanisms are rare. 
In short, public participation in public administration is conceived as a criti- 
cal element in decision making and implementation, but it is rarely determina- 
tive in its own right. One mechanism that notably reflects the promise of the 
delegative approach may be the so-called citizen jury (Bingham, Nabatchi, & 
O’Leary, 2005; Callanan, 2005; Crosby, Kelly, & Schafer, 1986). As detailed 
by Smith and Wales (2000), “a citizens’ jury brings together a group of ran- 
domly chosen citizens to deliberate on a particular issue, whether it is the set- 
ting of a policy agenda or the choice of particular policy options” (p. 55). Under 
the guidance of a trained moderator, jury members analyze evidence presented 
by witnesses and produce a report detailing their findings and recommenda- 
tions. Thus, the citizen jury can “serve as a proxy for the public at-large” as it 
is assumed that its conclusion reflects that which would have been reached if 
the community itself were to have deliberated (Roberts, 2008, p. 297). Although 
similarities to juries in the legal system are apparent, the citizens’ jury model 
has not been widely adopted or produced significant, direct influence on the 
political decision-making process (Smith & Wales, 2000). 
Nevertheless, the citizen jury approach explicitly demands that a demo- 
graphically representative body be drawn from the community (Roberts, 
2008). Other than the Model Cities program, it is rare for discussions of citizen 
participation to formally incorporate considerations of the diversity of the citi- 
zen participants. Although there is evidence that the preferences of partici- 
pants and nonparticipants may not differ significantly, John (2009) observed 
that “many believe there is a link between the inequality in participation and . 
. . outputs and outcomes” and that “a degree of equality in political participa- 
tion is symbolically important for a legitimate political system” (p. 495). 
Thus, Fung (2006) asserts that legitimacy, justice, and effective gover- 
nance are key considerations in the evaluation of public participation mecha- 
nisms in a democracy. Accordingly, “(r)andomly selecting participants from 
among the general population is the best guarantee of descriptive representa- 
tiveness” (pp. 67-68, italics in original). Furthermore, Fung suggests that the 
“deliberative ideal” is approximated in settings where “participants engage 
with one another directly as equals who reason together about public prob- 
lems” (p. 68). Finally, the ideal for enhancing political equality and justice 
may be achieved when citizen participants are empowered to exercise “direct 
authority” over a public decision (pp. 69, 72). 
 
 
 
 
Having considered the extant literature on citizen participation, we make 
a conceptual argument and perform an empirical examination in this study. 
First, we posit that juries in the criminal justice system represent a type of 
participation mechanism that has both been overlooked by scholars in public 
administration and one that ought to belong in the prevailing paradigm as an 
all-to-rare example of a delegative mechanism of participation. Notably, 
juries are not among the 26 mechanisms of citizen participation identified by 
Stewart (2007). Second, we examine whether the racial makeup of a jury 
affects its decision making. 
 
Juries in the Legal System 
Although an underappreciated topic in public administration scholarship, 
juries in criminal cases constitute a compelling example of citizen participa- 
tion in public decision making and embody the rare characteristic of citizens 
being the determining actors. The right to a trial by an impartial jury is most 
obviously  established  in  Article  III  and  Amendment  XI  to  the  U.S. 
Constitution.
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The standard jury has 12 jurors, and they are usually required 
to reach a unanimous decision to be deemed successful. This “exciting exper- 
iment in the conduct of serious human affairs” is not without controversy, but 
the intention of the jury model is noble indeed (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966, p. 4). 
Ideally, juries constitute an impartial, representative cross-section of the 
community and protect the accused from abuses of the state’s superior 
resources and expansive powers. Jury members are first selected randomly 
from a master list drawn primarily from registered voters, but lists of tele- 
phone  numbers,  utility  customers,  and  licensed  drivers  are  also  used 
(Neubauer, 2008).
3 
Procedurally, juries are intended to establish a nonhierar- 
chical structure where each member’s voice and vote is equal in prominence 
and essential for successful deliberation and decision making. 
This manifestation of this ideal, however, hinges partly on the representa- 
tiveness of the jury. Thus, the second stage of jury selection is the process of 
whittling down the randomly selected pool to a 12-person jury. The outcome 
of this process sets the stage for the trial to come. Indeed, “many lawyers 
believe that trials are won or lost on the basis of which jurors are selected” 
(Neubauer, 2008, pp. 295-296). Attorneys for both the prosecution and 
defense are empowered to protest the pool itself on the grounds that it is not 
representative of the community. Potential jurors can also be excluded from 
the pool during the “voir dire” process when two types of challenges can be 
levied regarding a potential juror. Challenges for cause are based on the argu- 
ment that a particular individual would not be a fair or impartial juror; these 
 
 
 
 
reasons are legally prescribed under state law and must be stated to the court 
(Schmalleger, 2005). 
The more controversial technique, the peremptory challenge, is an explicit 
strategy to shape jury composition and reflects the reality that neither side 
really wants jurors who are open-mined and objective (Barkan & Bryjak, 
2004). Attorneys for both the prosecution and defense use a limited number 
of peremptory challenges to seek jurors predisposed to their side and elimi- 
nate potential jurors who may be desirable to the opposition. Traditionally, 
potential jurors could be excluded by one of the attorneys for any reason, and 
these do not need to be stated in court. The so-called Batson rule (from the 
U.S. Supreme Court case Batson v. Kentucky, 1986), however, prevents 
exclusion solely on the basis of the race of the potential juror. The decision 
was based, in part, on a desire to increase the public’s confidence in the integ- 
rity and fairness of the nation’s court systems (Dougherty, Beck, & Bradbury, 
2003). A subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decision, J.E.B. v. Alabama (1994), 
extended the prohibition to cover gender-based exclusions. Such prohibitions 
serve to curb explicitly race-based and gender-based preemptory challenges, 
but the practice certainly persists in a more nuanced manner. 
 
Juror Bias 
The implicit motivation behind strategic efforts to shape jury composition by 
race, gender, or any other demographic characteristic is the belief that the 
decision making of jurors is partly a function of such latent characteristics. 
Reminiscent of the logical underpinnings of the theory of representative 
bureaucracy in public administration, demographically based peremptory 
challenges assume that the life experiences of a juror will affect their assess- 
ments of evidence, witnesses, and the accused, and that these experiences are 
often a function of race, gender, age, social class, and the like (Barkan & 
Bryjak, 2004). An early attempt to assess the extent to which “extra-legal” 
factors influence decision making found that jurors who voted to convict were 
not significantly different from jurors who vote to acquit in terms of gender, 
race, age, and education (Mills & Bohannon, 1980). Subsequent research sug- 
gested that such factors may play a role when the prosecution’s case is rela- 
tively weak (Reskin & Visher, 1986). In a widely cited review of previous 
studies, Ford (1986) concluded that the evidence is unclear as to whether 
social and demographic factors influence juror behavior. Nevertheless, public 
opinion in the wake of high-profile cases, such as the first criminal trial of O. 
J. Simpson, indicates a persistent belief that the race of the accused in relation 
to the race of jurors may affect the jury’s disposition (Coleman, 1996). 
 
 
 
 
Such a relationship suggests that an in-group/out-group bias may occur as 
jurors make individual and collective determinations regarding the accused 
(M. R. Williams & Burek, 2008). In-group bias may occur when shared 
demographic characteristics between the accused and jurors lead the latter to 
regard the former more favorably than a similarly situated defendant who 
does not share the characteristic. For example, Bowers, Sandys, and Brewer 
(2004) found that, for Black defendants, 
 
African-American male jurors were significantly more likely than oth- 
ers to imagine themselves in the situation of the defendant’s family, to 
imagine themselves as a member of the defendant’s family, to be 
reminded of someone by the defendant, and less likely than others to 
see the defendant’s family as different from their own. (pp. 1531-1532) 
 
Out-group bias operates in an analogous fashion as jurors may be less 
sympathetic or empathetic toward the defense when the juror does not share 
foundational characteristics with the accused. In this manner, society’s inter- 
ests are perhaps better served when a jury reflects the demographics of the 
community rather than allowing for an all-Black jury for Black defendants, 
for example, notwithstanding the probable preferences of such a defendant to 
have jurors who have shared experiences and demographics (Golash, 1992). 
Evidence of the performance of Black jurors in actual trials, as opposed 
to the more prevalent but circumspect research of mock juries,
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is rare 
because most jury-eligible cases are resolved through an intervening mecha- 
nism such as plea bargaining (Neubauer, 2008). The difficulty in studying 
Black jurors is compounded by various historic barriers to the service of 
Blacks on juries and that there are small pools of potential Black jurors in 
some communities (Fukurai, Butler, & Krooth, 1993). Nonetheless, Bowers 
et al. (2004) examined 353 capital sentencing trials where the defendant was 
Black and the victim was White. They found that mixed-race juries were 
more likely to air conflict during deliberations, the potential relevance of 
mitigating circumstances was more likely to be discussed, and all jurors 
were more likely to “acknowledge how race colors their perspectives and 
how the race of other jurors may do likewise” (Bowers et al., p. 1532). 
Turning from the process of jury deliberation to verdicts and sentencing, 
Wishman (1986) argued that Black jurors are less likely to convict Black 
defendants because of a “feeling of brotherhood” (p. 116). Similarly, Fleury- 
Steiner (2002) reported that, on a jury with 11 Whites, the 1 Black woman 
was the only juror who did not initially vote to impose a death sentence, 
although she ultimately joined in an affirmative vote. 
 
 
 
 
 
M. R. Williams and Burek (2008) performed the most inclusive examina- 
tion of the effects that juror race has on the convictions of Black defendants. 
Using actual jury trial data from multiple jurisdictions and different types of 
crimes, they found that juries with a higher percentage of White jurors were 
more likely to convict Black defendants, even when controlling for the strength 
of the prosecutor’s case (see Reskin & Visher, 1986). These results suggest 
that out-group bias may be more likely to affect outcomes as a jury’s demo- 
graphics approach homogeneity, and especially a jury of all White members. 
 
Juries as Public Participation 
The definition of citizen participation offered by Roberts (2008) requires a 
process wherein members of society directly participate in the making of 
substantive decisions; juries in the criminal justice system clearly embody 
these notions. The omission of juries from inventories of public participation 
mechanisms (see Stewart, 2007) is an oversight that ought to be rectified so 
that juries can be examined empirically in accordance with values integral to 
the public administration tradition. Notably, the jury model fares well on the 
key considerations of legitimacy, justice, and effective governance (Fung, 
2006). Notably, the random selection of the jury pool from among the gen- 
eral population represents “the best guarantee of descriptive representative- 
ness” (pp. 67-68). Furthermore, juries are typified by a nonhierarchical 
structure where each member’s voice and vote are equal in prominence and 
essential for successful deliberation and decision making, thereby approxi- 
mating the “deliberative ideal” (p. 68). Considering that juries are empow- 
ered to exercise “direct authority” over a public decision (p. 69), the 
combined effects of these characteristics place the jury model near the ideal 
for enhancing political equality and justice (p. 72). 
Such a laudatory assessment is tempered, however, by the second stage of 
jury selection where the demographic characteristics of potential jurors can be 
considered in determining the actual composition of the jury. Thus, the jury that 
is ultimately seated often does not represent the community in a descriptive 
sense. Instead, juror selection reflects strategic choices made by both parties in 
the case regarding the predisposition of jurors toward the accused. Consistent 
with the logical underpinnings of the theory of representative bureaucracy (see 
Bradbury & Kellough, 2011), it is presumed that Black jurors, for example, 
will be more inclined to be sympathetic toward Black defendants than will 
While jurors. Having made the case that juries ought to be part of the public 
participation paradigm, we turn to an empirical examination of whether diver- 
sity in jury composition is indeed related to decision making and outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
Hypotheses 
Two hypotheses are clearly derived from the prevailing literature on juries. 
We expect to find jurors of the same race or ethnicity as the defendant to be 
more likely to vote to acquit, whereas jurors of a different race or ethnicity 
will be more likely to vote to convict. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Black defendants will be more likely to be convicted by 
juries composed of a higher number of White jurors 
Hypothesis 2: Black defendants will be more likely to be convicted by 
juries composed of a higher number of Hispanic jurors. 
 
The second hypothesis is notable as it examines the extent to which mem- 
bers of minority groups may, or may not, advocate for each other; the evidence 
is scant within the public administration literature on such intergroup dynam- 
ics.
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Most of the available evidence tests for competition for jobs but does not 
reveal a dominant pattern on the question of whether gains made by one group 
are made at the expense of other groups (see Selden, 1997). In a recent exami- 
nation of discrimination in U.S. public school districts, Rocha and Hawes 
(2009) found that minority teachers lower the levels of disproportionate aca- 
demic grouping and discipline for all minority students, not merely coethnics. 
Turning to Hispanics more directly, the Criminal Justice literature, itself, is 
sparse with regard to decisions of Hispanic jurors. One of the reasons for this 
is Hispanics have historically been excluded from jury service due to statutory 
requirements of citizenship and/or using English as a first language (see 
Enriquez & Clark, 2007). As a result, studies that do exist tend to focus on 
mock juries that are able to manipulate the percentage of Hispanic jurors who 
serve. In addition, these studies tend to focus on relationships between White 
or Hispanic jurors and White or Hispanic defendants, leaving Blacks out of the 
equation altogether (see Daudistel, Hosch, Holmes, & Graves, 1999; Perez, 
Hosch, Ponder, & Trejo, 1993). One exception is a study by Abwender and 
Hough (2001), who found that, in their mock jury experiment featuring 
vignettes of a vehicular homicide case, Hispanic jurors tend to show more 
leniency toward White defendants compared with Black defendants. The 
authors attribute this to the possibility that Hispanics perceived the White 
defendant as “more of an in-group member” (Abwender & Hough, 2001, 
p. 612). Although the use of a mock jury makes it difficult to assess the gener- 
alizability of such a finding, the paucity of extant research leads us to rely on 
Abwender and Hough as the basis for the second hypothesis that Hispanic 
jurors will be more likely to convict a Black defendant than will Black jurors. 
 
  
 
 
 
Method 
The data for the current study were collected by Hannford-Agor, Hans, Mott, 
and Munsterman (2001) for their examination of hung jury verdicts in non- 
capital felony cases in Maricopa County, Arizona; Los Angeles, California; 
Bronx, New York; and Washington, D.C. The authors collected data for trials 
held in 2000 and 2001 in an attempt to compare juries that convicted defen- 
dants with juries that deadlocked; data collected included type of charge, 
sentence, jury decision, demographic characteristics of defendants and vic- 
tims, jury selection, trial evidence and procedures, and jury deliberations. 
The researchers also distributed surveys to judges, attorneys, and jurors, but 
this information is not used in the present study (see Eisenberg et al., 2005). 
What is compelling and rare about the data is that it represents character- 
istics of actual jury trials, as opposed to mock juries. The artificiality of mock 
juries does not lend itself to adequate generalizability; actual jury trials pro- 
vide a better illustration of the diversity and unique complexity of jury ser- 
vice and decision making (see Bornstein & McCabe, 2005; Costabile & 
Klein, 2005). However, the rarity of data from actual jury trials triggers con- 
cerns over the representativeness of the resulting analysis. For this study, we 
do not suppose predictability but rather assert that juries should be part of the 
public participation typology in public administration and that the racial 
makeup of juries can affect their decision making. Analysis of data from 
other actual jury trials may support or counter our findings on juror diversity; 
we welcome such analysis as it would constitute, by definition, a strengthen- 
ing of our core argument regarding the relevance of juries to the public par- 
ticipation literature in public administration. 
For our study, only Black defendants were examined, as they comprised 
approximately 60% of all defendants across the jurisdictions. Whites (10%) 
and Hispanics (24%) represented a smaller number of defendants, which 
made examination of any meaningful relationships suspect. 
A logistic regression model is used to examine the effects of the percent- 
age of Blacks, White, and Hispanics on the jury on the likelihood of convic- 
tion of Black defendants (see M. R. Williams & Burek, 2008). However, such 
models need to account for contextual factors that may influence a juror to 
look past the race of the defendant, for example, and act in a neutral, unbiased 
manner. As Stewart (2007) asserted, “institutions matter and . . . the rules by 
which decisions are made affect decision-making process outcomes” (p. 
1070). Thus, variables measuring the quantity of evidence, strength of the 
prosecutor’s case, the length of the trial, the length of jury deliberations, and 
the presence of written instructions are included in the model. 
 
  
 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable was whether or not a trial resulted in a conviction; 
thus, conviction was coded as 0 = no, 1 = yes. This variable takes into 
account the very real possibility that defendants will be convicted on only 
some (or one) of the charges brought to trial and/or the likelihood of being 
convicted of lesser charges. Therefore, a conviction on any charge is coded 
as a conviction. Acquittals and hung juries were coded as “no.” See Table 1 
for descriptive statistics for all variables. 
 
Independent Variables 
The primary variable of interest was the racial makeup of the jury. Percent 
Black, percent White, and percent Hispanic were each coded to examine the 
percentage of the respective groups serving on the jury. One model was con- 
structed, which included percent White and percent Hispanic as dummy vari- 
ables, with percent Black as the reference category. Each of these is based on 
previous research, which concluded that the racial makeup of the jury, com- 
bined with the race of the defendant, has an effect on case outcomes (see 
Abwender & Hough, 2001; Perez et al., 1993; M. R. Williams & Burek, 2008). 
 
Control Variables 
As mentioned, five independent variables collectively assess the decision- 
making context of serving on a jury and are expected to confound the nega- 
tive relationship between Black defendants being convicted and the 
percentage of Black jury members. Kalven and Zeisel (1966) argued that a 
conviction is more likely when the prosecutor’s case is relatively strong. 
Similarly, Harmon and Lofquist (2005) stated that a higher quantity of evi- 
dence presented by the prosecutor can sway a jury toward conviction. Thus, 
two variables were used to measure the strength of the prosecutor’s case. 
Quantity of evidence measured the number of exhibits and witnesses that the 
prosecutor presented during the trial, and strength of case was an assessment 
of each jury member’s view of the prosecutor’s and defense’s case, ranging 
from consistently weak (coded as 1) to consistently strong (coded as 7). Each 
juror’s response in each trial was calculated to provide a mean indicator of 
the strength of the prosecutor’s case compared with the defense’s case. This 
was converted into a ratio where “above one” indicated that jurors felt the 
prosecutor’s case was stronger than the defense’s case and “below one” indi- 
cated that jurors felt the prosecutor’s case was weaker than the defense’s 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 1. Variables in the Analyses 
 
 
Strength of prosecution’s case (ratio of prosecution’s case relative to defense’s case) 
M = 1.52 Median = 1.39    Minimum = 0.33   Maximum = 6.00 SD = 0.89 
Quantity of evidence in prosecution’s case (number of witnesses and exhibits) 
M = 19.82  Median = 12.00  Minimum = 0.00   Maximum = 235 SD = 25.74 
Case type 
Violent 
No = 0 (50%) 
Yes = 1 (50%) 
Property 
No = 0 (88%) 
Yes = 1 (12%) 
Drug 
No = 0 (71%) 
Yes = 1 (29%) 
Attorney type 
Appointed = 0 (83%) 
Retained = 1 (17%) 
Written instructions 
No = 0 (39%) 
Yes = 1 (61%) 
Length of trial (days) 
M = 4.41 Median = 3.00  Minimum = 1.00  Maximum = 24.00 SD = 3.24 
Length of deliberations (hours) 
M = 5.55 Median = 3.50  Minimum = 1.00  Maximum = 40.00 SD = 6.16 
Conviction 
No = 0 (62%) 
Yes = 1 (38%) 
Percentage Black 
M = 26.73 Median = 20.00 Minimum = 0.00  Maximum = 100.00  SD = 25.60 
Percentage White 
M = 45.68 Median = 41.70 Minimum = 0.00  Maximum = 100.00  SD = 19.11 
Percentage Hispanic 
M = 21.72  Median = 16.70  Minimum = 0.00   Maximum = 100.00  SD = 27.20 
Total N = 146 
 
 
 
case. We hypothesize that the greater a quantity of evidence and a strong 
prosecutor’s case will increase the likelihood of conviction irrespective of 
jury composition. 
 
 
 
 
Two variables measure the duration of the jury experience: length of trial 
and length of deliberations. We hypothesize that longer trial and deliberation 
experiences immerse jurors in the case and will counteract a possible in-
group bias for Black jurors in particular. 
The last variable that assesses the decision-making context, written 
instructions, was included because it represents the issuance of a written 
reminder from the judge to the jury of their role and responsibilities. Thus, 
the presence of such instructions should confound the effect that shared 
demographics may have on the disposition of Black jurors in particular. 
The final two control variables account for two standard characteristics of 
criminal trials. Case type covers whether the defendant was charged with a 
violent crime (0 = no, 1 = yes) or a property crime (0 = no, 1 = yes). Violent 
crimes and property crimes were used as dummy variables in the model, 
while drug crimes are the reference category for this variable. The reasons for 
using drug crimes as the reference category are that drug crimes are respon- 
sible for the largest growth in prison populations since the 1980s, when com- 
pared with other types of crimes, and that has resulted in the unprecedented 
adjudication of Black defendants in the criminal justice system (see Chen, 
2008; Crawford, Chiricos, & Kleck, 1998; Spohn & Cederblom, 1991). Thus, 
it is necessary to compare violent and property offenses with drug crimes to 
assess any effect that drug crimes may have on conviction. Last, attorney type 
was assessed for its potential effect on conviction. It has been argued that 
certain defense attorneys (i.e., public defenders or assigned counsel) do not 
perform as well as privately retained attorneys (see Uphoff, 2006). Thus, the 
use of a private attorney should be negatively correlated with conviction rate. 
 
Results 
Table 2 provides the logistic regression analysis featuring the percent White 
and percent Hispanic dummy variables and the other independent variables 
of interest. As hypothesized, juries comprising a higher percentage of White 
jurors are more likely to convict Black defendants (odds ratio = 1.022, p < 
.01) than juries comprising a higher percentage of Black jurors (the refer- 
ence category). The percentage of Hispanics on the jury was also signifi- 
cant, but at a higher alpha level. Juries comprising a higher percentage of 
Hispanic jurors are more likely to convict Black defendants (odds ratio = 
1.019, p < .10). This finding, again, was only significant at a higher alpha 
level, so support for the hypothesis is marginal. Although the odds ratios 
themselves are only slightly larger than 1, the significance of these variables 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Logistic Regression Analysis for Conviction 
 
 
B SE Odds ratio 
 
Strength of case −0.031 .229 0.970 
Quantity of evidence −0.002 .012 0.998 
Case type    
Violent −0.929 .403 0.395** 
Property −1.081 .677 0.339* 
Attorney type 0.414 .531 1.512 
Written instructions −0.380 .434 0.684 
Length of trial 0.069 .084 1.072 
Length of deliberations −0.038 .040 0.962 
Percentage White 0.022 .008 1.022*** 
Percentage Hispanic 0.019 .012 1.019* 
Note: −2 log likelihood = 171.694. Nagelkerke R2 = .17. N = 146. 
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
 
 
points to the conclusion that there is, indeed, a slightly higher likelihood of 
conviction of Black defendants by these juries. 
Among the other variables, juries were less likely to convict Black defen 
dants of violent crimes when compared with drug crimes (odds ratio = 
0.395). Juries were also less likely to convict Black defendants of property 
crimes when compared with drug crimes (odds ratio = 0.339), though this is 
only marginally significant at the .10 alpha level. The odds ratios for these 
variables are quite low, which indicates a strong correlation with the depen 
dent variable. Importantly, none of the variables that approximate decision- 
making context were significant. 
These results support M. R. Williams and Burek (2008) by finding that 
juries with a higher percentage of White jurors are more likely to convict 
Black defendants. Also, the percentage of Hispanic jurors on a jury also has 
an effect on the conviction of Black defendants, though at a lower alpha level. 
Due to the lack of previous research on Hispanic jurors, the results focusing 
on these jurors should be seen as exploratory. Indeed, few empirical studies 
have examined jury convictions with regard to race of defendant and case 
type; in fact, most studies tend to focus on sentencing decisions by judges. 
Thus, this analysis supports the hypothesized link for Black jury members 
and Black defendants, holding constant the decision-making context of the 
jury’s deliberations. 
 
  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
The findings with regard to jury composition and convictions of Black defen 
dants make a valuable contribution to the literatures of both criminal justice 
and public administration. For the former, the consistent pattern of Black 
defendants being more likely to be convicted of drug crimes than for violent 
crimes, regardless of jury composition by race, combines two previously dis 
parate streams of research. From a practical perspective, if the criminal justice 
system is generally tougher on Blacks charged with drug-related offenses than 
for violent crimes, then our findings would seem to support a defense strategy 
of seeking a jury trial for those charged with violent offenses. Of course, our 
findings also suggest that attorneys for Black defendants can increase the 
odds of an acquittal by seeking out Black jurors. While such a finding may 
not be revelatory to criminal defense attorneys, our study provides rigorous 
empirical support for the continued relevance of race in criminal proceedings. 
Equally notable are the implications of the findings for discussions of public 
participation found in public administration. We make the conceptual 
assertion that juries ought to be included in that literature’s typologies and 
analyses. Juries are the rare type of public participation where the citizens are 
the determining actors of a discrete public policy decision, and thus the 
dynamics of jury behavior are particularly relevant. Second, our findings 
reinforce the proposition that precisely who from the public writ large is 
included in a given public participation opportunity may affect the output of 
that deliberation. In our study, Black jurors are less likely to convict Black 
defendants than are White jurors, with the effect of Hispanic jurors being 
interesting but exploratory in nature. 
Overall, discussions of public participation ought to move away from a 
generic discussion of “the public” and make careful consideration of which 
members of the public are, and are not, participating, as this may influence 
the deliberative process and/or result. Because our data are not likely to be 
representative of “average” jury trials, further discussions of the effect that 
diversity has on public participation are urged. We hope that our conceptual 
argument and empirical analysis trigger new avenues of exploration into the 
all-important topics of citizen participation in the affairs of the community 
and the effects that diversity may have on such participation. 
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Notes 
1. See Public Administration and Management, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2010. 
2. Text of Article III: The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall 
be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall 
have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be 
at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed. Amendment 
XI: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained 
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con- 
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
3. Of course, some otherwise eligible members of society are excluded from jury 
service, notably convicted felons. 
4. Due to the practitioner orientation of the field of public administration, we have 
focused our literature review of juries to include only those studies that examine 
actual juries as they behave in reality as opposed to the studies of mock juries. 
5. Notably, there is little mention of interracial issues in high-profile reviews of the 
extant literature on diversity (see Guy & Schumacher 2009; Meier, 1993; Pitts & 
Wise, 2010; K. Williams & O’Reilly, 1998; Wise & Tschirhart, 2000). 
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